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Kiel Institute for World Economics 
April 2002 
Abstract 
Initiatives to reduce transatlantic trade barriers or to harmonize trade-related domestic policies in 
the EU and the US appear regularly on the agenda of policy makers. The last decade saw also 
considerable steps in transatlantic economic cooperation focusing on special aspects. In February 
2002, a new call for a study on the benefits of a transatlantic free trade area (TAFTA) was made by 
the President of the EU Council to facilitate further liberalization schemes. This article examines 
recent developments in transatlantic economic policies, discusses changes in approaches in 
transatlantic regionalism and presents estimates of the economic consequences of transatlantic 
liberalization. Given the expected small benefits of a TAFTA and the induced costs for multilateral 
liberalization negotiations, the article discusses alternatives to TAFTA and argues for a 
multilateral approach, eventually being accompanied by some sort of open regionalism. 
 
Institutionalizing economic relations between the EU and the US has been on the political 
agenda for many years. In recent years, however, there has been a shift from the traditional 
trade policy focus to issues of securing market access and harmonizing trade-related 
domestic policies. In February 2002, for instance, the EU commissioner for transportation, 
Loyola de Palacio, proposed the creation of a transatlantic air space. In November 2001, 




transatlantic currency is “by all means possible”.1 Large transatlantic mergers as between 
Daimler Benz and Chrysler underline that transatlantic cooperation in competition policies 
is an issue of growing importance.  
The academic discussion on institutionalization of transatlantic economic relations has 
centred primarily on the merits of a free trade area between the EU and the US (cf. 
SIEBERT  ET AL., 1996; WOLFE, 1996; DONGES  ET AL., 1997; LÜBCKE,  PIAZOLO, 1998; 
HINDLEY, 1999; SCHOTT, OEGG, 2001, SIEBERT 2002). This article resumes the traditional 
debate on the effects of such an area and departs from recent policy initiatives in 
transatlantic relations during the nineties (Section 1). These initiatives have been 
accompanied by important changes in EU and US policies towards bilateral and regional 
trade relations. These changes will be introduced in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the 
potential benefits which may arise from TAFTA (Transatlantic Free Trade Area) while 
Section 4 addresses its costs both internally as well as externally for third parties. Section 5 
stylizes alternatives to a rigid institutionalized FTA (Free Trade Area) without forgoing its 
benefits. Section 6 concludes on the results. 
1   Transatlantic Economic Cooperation since the Madrid Summit 
As a result of the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration, EU-US economic summits were 
introduced to give bilateral relations a new momentum. Each of these summits addressed  a 
special aspect of cooperation. At the EU-US summit of December 1995 in Madrid, the EU 
and the US formally approved the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and a Joint EU-US 
Action Plan for implementation. Apart from economic and trade issues, the NTA included 
                                            
1   R.  SELTEN stated “Es ist durchaus im Bereich des Möglichen, dass es zu einer transatlantischen 




a wide range of commitments to cooperate in areas such as foreign and security policy, 
international crime, drug trafficking preventions, migration, environment and health. With 
the NTA, the EU and the US tried to establish an institutionalized forum for transatlantic 
cooperation and to increase the scope for joint action without moving toward 
institutionalized regional integration. 
At the EU-US Summit of May 1997 in the Hague, the Agreement on Customs Cooperation 
and Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters was signed and in December 1997 the Science 
and Technology Agreement was endorsed, which extends and strengthens the conduct of 
co-operative activities between EU scientific institutions and a range of US government 
research agencies. 
One year later in May 1998 in London, the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) was 
created, which seeks to improve the economic relationship between the EU and the US as 
well as to create an open and more accessible world trading system. In the same year, the 
European Commission and the US Administration accepted the TEP Action Plan that 
identified areas for common actions of bilateral as well as multilateral concerns. Apart 
from a comprehensive TEP Steering Group, specialized working groups focusing on 
specific issues of the TEP Action Plan (like the TEP Working Groups on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Biotechnology, or Food Safety) were set up. The TEP Steering Group 
provides also the forum for the recommendations of the transatlantic dialogues, i.e. the 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue, the Transatlantic Environment Dialogue, the 
Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue, the Transatlantic Labor Dialogue, the Legislators' 
Business Dialogue and the Transatlantic Development Dialogue. 
                                                                                                                                    




In June 1998, also the EU-US Agreement on the application of positive comity principles 
in the enforcement of competition laws was signed, and in December 1998 the EU-US 
Agreement on Mutual Recognition became effective covering specific goods areas like 
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, telecom equipment, electromagnetic compatibility, 
electric safety and recreational craft. 
At the EU-US Summit of June 1999 in Bonn, both sides committed themselves to a "full 
and equal partnership" in economic, political and security affairs, which was seen as 
further advancement since the NTA document. The EU-US Veterinary Equivalence 
Agreement was signed in July 1999 and aims at facilitating trade in live animals and 
animal products. 
At the EU-US Summit of May 2000 in Lisbon, the Consultative Forum on Biotechnology 
was established to improve the communication and understanding on the various concerns 
involved in biotechnology. Furthermore, progress on the so called "Safe Harbor Principles" 
for the adequate protection of personal data transfers were advanced. 
At the EU-US Summit of June 2001 in Göteborg, the shared commitment for a new round 
of multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Doha was emphasized 
as well as the need to promote the digital economy and to make its benefits available to all 
citizens. 
In February 2002, the Spanish government holding the EU presidency at that time, 
initiated a call for a study of the benefits of lower transatlantic trade barriers.  
Such regularity in bilateral cooperation could suggest a détente in transatlantic trade policy 
disputes which in the past rattled the multilateral trading system time and again. However, 




genetically modified organisms, tax privileges of Foreign Sales Corporations, and on safe-
guard tariffs imposed against US steel imports, to name only few of them, have figured 
prominently in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and sometimes remained 
unresolved throughout the entire procedure. Both actors report permanently on barriers to 




the partner country’s market2 and exchange views how to settle disputes bilaterally as well 
as multilaterally. Interestingly, many of these disputes do not cover border measures but 
trade-related domestic policies. Hence, they would not necessarily vanish if an “old age” 
free trade area (FTA) would be established. Instead, to be meaningful, a “new age” FTA 
would have to include harmonization of trade-related domestic policies.3 
2  Policy Shifts in EU and US Regionalism 
In the nineties, both parties have changed their policies toward regionalism significantly. 
First, the EU announced to convert non-reciprocal preferential agreements into reciprocal 
FTAs in order to comply with WTO commitments of tighter discipline enforced against 
invoking GATT Art. XXIV. Regionally, such conversion refers to bilateral agreements 
with the Mediterranean countries and with the so-called Lomé group of African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries. Furthermore, as in Central Europe where in addition to the 
Europe where in addition to the Europe Agreements with the EU a FTA was formed 
between the accession candidates under EU initiative, the EU encourages the formation of 
regional groupings among Mediterranean countries on one hand and ACP countries on the 
other hand. Such groupings will erode the hub-and-spoke character of former bilateral 
agreements which gave the EU as the hub privileged access to all “spokes” while denying 
the spokes privileged access to each other markets. 
                                            
2   In July 2001, the EU Commission issued the 17th annual report on US barriers to trade and investment 
and the US Trade Representative in his annual report lists EU barriers, respectively. 
3   See for such “new age” agreement the recent case of a bilateral FTA between Japan and Singapore 




Second, the EU has negotiated and concluded FTAs with countries outside Europe such as 
the Latin American integration scheme Mercosur and with Mexico. Given that these 
countries will never be eligible for EU membership, the EU expands reciprocal agreements 
beyond the European region where such agreements could be understood and legitimized 
as pre-accession “training” stages. Instead, agreements with Latin American countries can 
be explained by “level playing field” motives, i.e. to match the US initiatives “to go 
regional” with these countries. It is evident that the EU move towards regional and 
bilateral agreements with Latin American countries erodes US preference margins and thus 
faces concerns in the US. However, it is argued that EU FTAs with Latin American 
countries strengthen the reform momentun in these countries and their international 
competitiveness and thus will also be beneficial for US traders and investors (SCHOTT and 
OEGG, 2001). 
The US policy shifts have been even more profound. Since the foundation of NAFTA, the 
US has increasingly deviated from its traditional post-war multilateral course and 
promoted regional agreements. The year 2001 was a watershed in this respect when the US 
President in his annual trade policy agenda declared EU regionalism as a benchmark to be 
followed by the US. In the same year, the hemispheric endeavour of a Free Trade 
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) linking all Latin and North American countries and 
hence avoiding the hub-and-spoke-syndrome was launched under US initiative. 
Agreements with Jordan and Asian countries are under way while the US support for the 
multilateral system remains ambiguous as indicated by the difficulties in achieving 
congressional endorsement of a WTO negotiation mandate for the US President. 
The move toward regionalism in US policies may have received indirect support by the 




promoted by the US, i.e., the so-called “open regionalism” in the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation APEC. APEC which comprises all neighbouring countries of the Pacific rim 
aims at a free trade area in 2020 at the latest and is a regionally concerted non-binding 
peer-driven approach toward free trade within an area which except for the EU would 
include all major trading partners in the world (LANGHAMMER, 1999). As concessions are 
non-binding and open to all non-APEC countries which adhere to the APEC approach,  
APEC is similar to conditional MFN treatment. Consequently, APEC is not notified under 
GATT Art. XXIV. 
To sum up, the US and EU have not only converged in terms of the general thrust of their 
trade policies, both now “going” more regional. They have also used trade policies to 
penetrate in each others economic backyard, the EU in Latin America and the US in the 
Mashreq area. Such expansion may open new areas of conflict but may also extend 
overlapping interests beyond the direct transatlantic trade and capital flows. The banana 
conflict between two basically non-banana producing areas indicates that both trade and 
investment interests of the two actors go far beyond the own territories. Via globalization 
of capital markets, almost each third country issue in trade policies automatically involves 
vested interests of the EU or US private sector. This has to be taken into consideration 
when focusing the negotiation issues between the EU and the US on the narrow aspect of 
direct bilateral interactions. 
 
 




Minimising discrimination against third countries at a given level of efficiency gains from 
forming a FTA is a yardstick which regional arrangements have to satisfy when compared 
to multilateral arrangements. The Vinerian customs union theory has provided the 
workhorse to specify the criteria when referring to trade creation as welfare enhancing 
effects of integration deepening and trade diversion as welfare decreasing effects of 
discrimination against third countries. 
3.1 Trade creation exceeding trade diversion?  
As a rule of thumb, the welfare-enhancing effect of efficiency gains inside the union (often 
referred to as a result of trade creation) is expected to exceed welfare-decreasing 
discrimination outside the union (referred to as trade diversion)  
•  the larger the initial share of the member countries in world trade 
•  and the larger the initial share of intra-regional trade in the total trade of the member 
countries. 
These two criteria can be applied to TAFTA. 
The EU and the US are the leading individual players of world trade closely followed by 
Japan. However, this ranking does not indicate an overwhelmingly dominant position in 
world trade. In 1999, the two actors accounted for 34 per cent of world total exports 
(including commodities) and 39 per cent of world manufactured exports (Table 1). Hence, 
more than 60 per cent of world trade (excluding intra-EU trade) cannot be attributed to 
them but to trading partners basically in Asia and other countries of the Western 




the observation that the trend since 1980 has been either stagnating (total trade) or 
declining (manufactures). This is most visible in manufactured exports where trade 
policies are especially relevant because of higher trade barriers than for commodities. 
While the share of the US in world manufactured exports remained more or less constant, 
that of the EU declined visibly due to both slower economic growth and inward 
orientation. With more dynamic trading partners outside TAFTA than inside, the risk of 
sizable discrimination effects cannot be ignored. 
As concerns the second criterion, the magnitude of intra-area trade, similar conclusions can 
be drawn as to the first one (Table 2). Both the US and the EU largely trade with other 
countries and again the overall trend in intra-"TAFTA"-trade has been declining, 
especially in manufactures, with the exception of the importance of the US market for EU 
manufactures. 
Merging the two criteria yields that in 1999 only about 9 per cent of world manufactured 
exports was due to US exports to the EU and EU exports to the US (after 8 per cent in 
1980). While this may signal a still untapped potential for trade expansion between the two 
areas, it mainly suggests that trade diversion effects of bilateral trade liberalization to the 
disadvantage of more dynamic trading partners outside TAFTA can be substantial. 
3.2 Quid pro quo investment as a shelter against a fortress TAFTA?  
Unlike in trade, EU-US foreign direct investment flows are substantial in both directions. 
The EU as well as the US are for one another the most important hosts for investment 
activity partly because the Asian markets (including Japan) have only recently started to 




EU-15 compared to 43 per cent in 1990 (Graph 1). In manufactures, almost half of total US 
FDI was located in the EU by end of the last decade. A particulary attractive sector for US 
FDI in Europe was the service sector after being liberalized in the context of the EU 1992 
programme to complete the single market. While in 1980 only 30 per cent of total US FDI 
in services were in Europe, this figure had risen to almost half some twenty years later. 
The other direction of investment flows is likewise substantial. In 1998, almost 49 per cent 
of total extra-EU FDI assets were held in the US. For the period 1992-98, this amounted on 
average to more than 51 per cent (EUROSTAT, 2001: 23). 
In terms of FDI outward flows, the US has become even more attractive during the 
nineties. From 1992 to 1999, the share of the US in total extra-EU FDI outward flows rose 
from 39 per cent to 69 per cent with annual average growth rates of almost 60 per cent 
(Figure 2). 
Overall, the outstanding characteristic of the EU-US economic relations is the mutual 
inter-linkage through FDI.4  Companies from both regions have considerable assets in the 
other region's market and are therefore strongly inclined to maintain well functioning 
transatlantic trade links in the absence of TAFTA. In this respect, foreign risk capital can 
act as quid pro quo investment, i.e. to diffuse protectionist threats by taking influence on 
the formulation of trade policies in the host country (BHAGWATI, DINOPOULOS, WONG, 
1992). It seems largely due to the intensity of bilateral investment ties that serious trade 
policy conflicts in the past could always be finally settled without escalating into a trade 
war. 
                                            




The central role of transatlantic FDI can be substantiated at the firm level, too, by 
consulting the DOME Database On Mergers in Europe. DOME consists of all merger 
cases between 1990 and the end of 1999 that were examined by the European Commission 
and therefore provides a good base to examine transatlantic activites in more detail 
(DOME, 2002; HAMMERMANN, KLEINERT, 2001). 
Table 3 gives a detailed classification of all investigated merger cases by the European 
Commission (column 1) by providing the number of merger cases that involve only EU 
countries (column 2), EU and Non-EU countries (column 3) or only Non-EU countries 
(column 4). Furthermore, Table 3 gives the number of transatlantic merger cases (column 
5) and their share in total (column 6) and in all the cases involving EU and Non-EU 
countries (column 7). During the period 1990 to 1999, the transatlantic activities accounted 
on average for 12.8 percent of all merger inquiries and for 58.2 percent of the inquires 
involving EU and Non-EU countries. This underlines that for extra-EU activities of EU 
companies, the US is by far the most decisive country. From 1990 (with 33.3 percent of all 
cases involving EU and Non-EU countries) to 1999 (with 66.2 percent of all these cases) 
the US gained considerable importance. Consequently, increasing transatlantic activities of 
companies lead to further economic and institutional interdependencies of the countries – 
even without the fixed setting of a TAFTA.   
3.3 Does imperfect competition wipe out concerns about TAFTA? 
The EU and the US share similarities in their income stage, levels of technology, and in the 
availability of capital and skilled labour. In a gravity model context, these similarities 
stand for “mass” and facilitate bilateral trade flows, in contrast to “distance” as the trade-




Similarities in factor endowment and high income levels suggest intra-industry trade based 
on imperfect competition to be dominant rather than inter-industry trade. Intra-industry 
trade is based on economies of scale as well as variety of preferences on the demand side 
and allows countries to benefit from larger markets and to consume a greater variety of 
goods. Under such conditions, the traditional trade creation and trade diversion debate 
based on perfect competition loses some of its relevance. What could make a high share of 
intra-industry trade an asset in this context  is that it is much less vulnerable to 
protectionism than inter-industry trade. Political opposition against liberalisation is 
diffused if freeing trade leads to expansion of both exports and imports in the same sector. 
Opposition against trade concessions on the import side can be contained if liberalisation 
promises to stimulate own exports from this sector, too. Both quid pro quo investment and 
intra-industry trade can stimulate the formation of a TAFTA but they can also protect 
transatlantic economic relations against a possible failure of an institutionalized free trade 
area. Liberalization is furthermore facilitated if the degree of openness between the 
members of a free trade arrangement is similar. Such openness can be approximated by the 
contribution of external imports to total domestic supply (apparent consumption). In the 
US and EU, this contribution was fairly similar during the eighties and early nineties 
(SIEBERT ET AL., 1996: 60).  
3.4 Are fears about discrimination effects against third countries overrated? 
The concept of “New Regionalism” (ETHIER, 1998) defends its positive assessment toward 
regional or bilateral trade agreements by pointing to the endogeneity of regionalism: It is 
derived from successful multilateral liberalization since a multilateral dismantling of 




remote partners anyway. In this realm, trade diversion effects would not play a major role 
since trade barriers vis-à-vis third countries had already been cut multilaterally thus 
leaving preference margins of intra-area trade at a low level. 
The EU and the US seem to meet such preconditions. After the Uruguay Round, their 
average bound industrial tariffs are among the lowest of all WTO member states, i.e., 4.1 
per cent and 3.9 per cent, respectively. All tariff lines are bound and the share of tariff lines 
with peak tariffs (above 15 per cent) is low as well (3.5 per cent and 1.5 per cent, 
respectively (WTO, 2001: Table II.2). Thus, cutting the remaining tariffs completely 
should neither result in major revenue losses nor be strongly opposed by affected 
industries. The former is relevant in the US  because under US law such losses have to be 
compensated for by other revenues. 
However, average tariffs and the focus on industrial tariffs conceal remnants of highly 
protected activities. Tariff escalation still exists in both industry and agriculture areas thus 
discriminating against finished goods industries and particularly against labor-intensive 
suppliers from the developing world, for instance in apparel items and specific processed 
food products. And even after the full implementation of the Uruguay Round, the estimates 
of the simple average MFN tariff rates for agriculture (excluding fish) are 9 per cent for the 
US and 20 per cent for the EU (FINGER, INGCO, REINCKE, 1996: 52). Estimates on the share 
of producer subsidies in producer’s gross receipts arrive at rates of almost 50 per cent in 
the EU and about half of that in the US. They indicate how widely the agricultural sector is 
still decoupled from market forces. It is very likely that under these conditions TAFTA 
would concede agriculture the same special status different from that for industrial 




It is obvious that the dismantling of remaining low average tariffs in bilateral trade parallel 
to the implementation of the Uruguay Round implies small preference margins compared 
to MFN treatment. Static trade effects would be small, too. SCHOTT (1995: 6) estimates 
that the total elimination of tariffs on bilateral trade would increase US exports to the EU 
by about 10.8 per cent and EU exports to the US by 6.3 per cent. This would be equivalent 
to an increase of total US trade of only 2.3 per cent (1993 figures) or 0.2 per cent of US 
GDP. For the EU, such static effects would be even lower (1.1 per cent and 0.1 per cent). 
Even if one takes into consideration that neither non-tariff barriers nor dynamic effects are 
taken into account, it is suggestive to argue that intra-TAFTA tariff liberalization confined 
to merchandise trade is unlikely to have a strong effect on changes in national income of 
the two trading partners. Nor can large trade diverting effects be expected to emerge from 
tariff dismantling only. Yet, this analysis neglects potential investment-creating effects of 
TAFTA as well as its incentives for product innovation derived from the strong intra-
industry component in bilateral trade.  
4  The Costs of TAFTA 
The preceding section has presented some arguments against the view that founding 
TAFTA as a traditional free trade area would be a sea change compared to the pre-TAFTA 
period. Nevertheless, costs both for the partners as well as for the rest of the world should 







4.1 The Domestic Dimension of TAFTA 
The basic domestic dimension of TAFTA consists of submitting all sectors and industries 
to the GATT discipline demanded in GATT Art. XXIV. This article requires to include 
“substantially all trade” in intra-FTA trade liberalization. It is known that neither in the 
GATT period nor during the early years of the WTO, this discipline could be enforced. 
Most FTAs regardless of whether they can be labeled “old “ or “new” still exclude 
“sensitive” sectors, above all agriculture (see LANGHAMMER/WÖßMANN, 2002). As a 
result, unequal treatment of sectors within a FTA distorts allocation decisions, supports 
costly excess capacities in protected industries and sectors and encourages the emergence 
of rent-seeking activities beyond national boundaries.  
Within TAFTA, agriculture which is protected in both partner areas but considerably more 
in the EU would be a showcase as can be witnessed by a number of empirical estimates. In 
his "1994 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers", the US Trade 
Representative claims that the elimination of the entire EU agricultural support system 
including variable levies, price supports and export subsidies would increase US exports to 
all EU markets between $4 billion and $5 billion while decreasing US imports about $2 
billion (USTR, 1994: 73).  
How far-reaching the liberalization of agricultural policies in the EU would be in terms of 
world welfare gains, is suggested by general equilibrium models. They yield that about 
half of all welfare gains arising from worldwide liberalization of the agricultural sector can 
be attributed to EU reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and that more than 
half of the entire effects of EU trade liberalization accrue to the reforms in the EU 
agricultural sector (HARRISON,  RUTHERFORD,  TARR, 1996). Corresponding effects of 




Secretariat suggest declining levels of producer support and protection in the EU and the 
US relative to the benchmark years 1986-1988 (OECD 2001: 14). Yet, it is also noted that 
this has primarily been due to international price and exchange rate movements rather than 
agricultural policy changes. 
The unbroken political attitude toward subsidization of the agricultural sector, the rising 
importance of so-called non-trade concerns in agriculture like food security, health, 
environmental protection, social stability in rural areas and animal protection as new cases 
for subsidization, and, finally, the still unsettled fundamentally different views in the EU 
and the USA on the use of biotechnological innovations in agricultural production are 
powerful barriers against liberalizing transatlantic trade in agriculture. It is therefore very 
unlikely  that both partners would agree to treat agriculture in TAFTA in the same way as 
manufactures and to submit it to the “substantially-all-trade” criterion. What has failed in 
WTO dispute settlement procedures between the EU and the US, cannot be easily solved 
within TAFTA. 
The agricultural sector is the most important stumbling bloc in a TAFTA which would 
meet the “substantially-all-trade” criterion. Yet, it is not the only on. Other sensitive 
sectors which have been partly subject to bilateral disputes in the GATT/WTO in the past  




More details on controversial issues can be collected from the list of barriers compiled by 
the US Trade Representative about the EU trade barriers and by the EU Commission about 
US barriers.5 
In March 2002, the US decided to introduce protective tariffs for at least three years for 
steel and steel products. The tariffs of between 15 and 30 percent affect all imports except 
for the NAFTA partner countries Mexico and Canada and from countries under a special 
status, i.e. Russia, Turkey, Brazil and Argentina. The US tariffs will affect about half of 




                                            
5 The National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers by the US Trade Representative (USTR, 
2001) charges the EU with protectionist trade barriers or behavior in the following areas: 
• The regime for the importation, sale, and distribution of bananas. 
• The regime for the importation of meat products from hormone treated cattle. 
• The market access for pharmaceuticals. 
• The approval process for genetically modified products. 
• Intellectual property protection. 
• Measures affecting the grant of copyrights. 
• The protection of trademarks and geographical indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs. 
• The requirements for hush kitted and recertified aircrafts. 
• Government procurement that discriminates against non-EU bids. 
• Export subsidies and government support for Airbus and Airbus suppliers. 
• The government support for shipbuilding industry. 
• The EU television broadcast requirement favoring European origin programs. 
On the other side, the EU COMMISSION (2002) complains about a number of US trade impediments, like: 
• Excessive registration, documentation and invoice requirements for importers by the US customs 
authorities. 
• Establishment of excessive user fees for formerly free service on the arrival of merchandise, vessels etc. 
• "Buy-American" requirements of government procurement. 
• Import restrictions or requirements concerning tuna-fishing, shrimps and dairy products. 
• Government support for aircraft production and shipbuilding. 
• Export subsidies for agricultural and fisheries product. 
• Entry barriers to the US banking market. 





4.2 The External Dimension of TAFTA 
The overall economic effects of transatlantic liberalization can be examined by applying 
computable general equilibrium models. This has been done by BALDWIN and FRANCOIS 
(1996 and 1997), who compare various degrees of transatlantic and multilateral 
liberalization schemes. Three simulations examine the effects of transatlantic liberalization 
for the involved partners and the rest of the world, whereas two further simulations analyze 
the consequences of multilateral efforts. The contents of these five simulation experiments 
are given in Table 4. 
The BALDWIN and FRANCOIS approach uses the GTAP database and features 23 sectors 
and 10 regions. It is important to note, that transatlantic liberalization measures include not 
only the EU and the US, but also corresponding steps by the two additional NAFTA 
members Mexico and Canada. The simulation results can be condensed into two main 
conclusions (cf. Table 5): 
1.  Negative effects from transatlantic liberalization for third countries do exist, but they 
are small. 
2. Multilateral liberalization efforts entail far more income gains than transatlantic 
schemes for the TAFTA partners (by factor 10) and substantial positive effects for the 
rest of the world.  
The insights of these simulation exercises underline the superiority of a multilateral 
approach: If economic gains are the target of liberalization initiatives of the transatlantic 





Discrimination of third countries 
The discrimination issue is of critical importance when assessing the compliance of 
TAFTA with the WTO requirements. As discussed above, preferential tariff margins 
matter less since they are going to be eroded with ongoing multilateral tariff dismantling. 
Instead, for non-TAFTA countries, the non-application of MFN principles regarding the 
compliance with TAFTA rules, norms and regulations deserves more attention. TAFTA 
would probably set common rules for many trade-related policy areas, including the rights 
of establishment of companies, capital mobility, environmental standards, and perhaps 
even for competition policies and investment codes. Given TAFTA’s economic weight and 
scale economies of rules, TAFTA rules would become globally dominant and binding6. 
How  such rules would be developed, either by ex ante harmonization or by mutual 
recognition (ex post harmonization), would be essential for third countries. The latter 
procedure would give them options to either comply with the EU or the US rules as each of 
them would give them access to the entire TAFTA market. The former procedure, 
however, could deteriorate conditions of access to one the two individual markets if the 
common standard would either be identical with the former US or EU standard or, more 
realistically, an average of the two. Net changes in access conditions would be ambiguous 
depending on changes in conditions of access to the other market. Again, the EU Single 
Market completion provides showcases for this problem. In principle, the EU Treaty offers 
both options but in practice has given priority to ex ante harmonization. As a result, 
regulations concerning the environment, for instance, became very much stricter in lower-
                                            
6   An analogy of this issue can be found in the completion of the European Single Market in 1992. Negative 
effects for companies from neighbouring EFTA countries were basically found in excluding them from 




income member states relative to pre-1992  and made access to these markets more costly 
for non-member states. 
In collective bargaining, non-TAFTA countries could therefore understand TAFTA as a 
signal that the world's richest countries are more concerned in jointly discriminating 
against the rest of the world than in opening their markets to countries with less demanding 
regulations and standards. There is the danger that TAFTA would be seen as a only 
slightly modified form of the rich man’s club which for a long time was a label for the 
GATT.  
Free trade arrangements with third countries 
The EU operates a most complex and extensive system of preferential trading agreement 
with other countries. It spans the entire spectrum of preferential trade agreements from free 
trade ares via customs unions, non-reciprocal agreements to unilateral trade concessions 
for developing countries (Generalised System of Preferences).  The year 2000 Trade Policy 
Review Report of the WTO on the EU notes that exclusively MFN treatment applies only 
to imports from eight WTO members (WTO 2000: 29). One of them is the US so that the 
group of WTO members subject to MFN treatment would shrink further. Similarly, the US 
has free trade agreements with Canada and Mexico apart from "hub-and-spoke" 
agreements with few other countries.  
Under these conditions, TAFTA would have to handle not only the policy framework for 
direct current account transactions but take into account incentives for indirect 
“circumvention” trade which is also called trade deflection. Trade deflection occurs if 
external tariffs of FTA partners differ from each other to the extent that imports into the 




a higher external tariff are profitable. For instance, TAFTA would have to fix conditions 
for Canadian exports to the EU which as a direct trade flow would not be eligible for duty-
free treatment but could indirectly benefit from TAFTA via exports to the US under the 
Canadian-US Free Trade Agreement before being shipped to the EU. To discourage trade 
deflection, TAFTA needs a complex rule of origin procedure to guarantee that intra-
TAFTA trade is treated more favourable than trade between a TAFTA member country 
with its hub-and spoke partner country. With increasing globalisation of production and 
markets, this could fuel trade policy disputes and lead to high transaction costs in order to 
separate beneficiaries from non-beneficiaries. In contrast to a customs union with a 
common external tariff, rules of origin in a free trade area are much more susceptible to 
abuse for protectionist purposes (KRUEGER, 1995). 
Consequences for the multilateral trading process 
Consequences for the multilateral trading process depend very much on the choice of the 
bilateral arrangement between the US and its spokes on the one hand and the EU and its 
spokes on the other hand. Either a Transatlantic Customs Union TACU or the automatic 
extension of all rights from bilateral agreements between one TAFTA member countries 
and third parties to TAFTA in total (the TAFTA-South approach) could be instrumental to 
prevent a further policy-induced segmentation of markets. TACU would be more 
consistent with GATT Art. XXIV but would require a uniform level of protection against 
third countries in such highly disputed sectors like services and agriculture. Ideally, such 
level should approximate the lower one of the two national levels in order to comply with 
the prescription that third parties’ rights under the WTO  should not  be nullified or 




Nevertheless, the formation of TAFTA would constitute the strongest building bloc   
towards regionalism and thus the most serious challenge to the multilateral approach of 
trade liberalisation. Given the economic leverage of the two partners, third countries would 
have to accept the outcome of bilateral intra-TAFTA negotiations as binding for the rest of 
the world. Negotations under the WTO framework would become widely obsolete. 
Furthermore, given historical experiences of successful lobbying in both areas for special 
sectoral privileges, it is very likely that TAFTA would not cover all sectors. Hence, both 
sectoral incompleteness and regional limitation would bend WTO rules and undermine the 
multilateral process. 
5  Alternatives to TAFTA on the Multilateral Level 
Three alternatives to TAFTA are open to discussion: 
5.1 The Conventional Way: Subordination to the WTO 
The easiest way to strengthen the multilateral system is to support the start of a new 
multilateral liberalization round which was endorsed by WTO member states in November 
2001 in Doha/Qatar. Clear signals of support would also be the postponement for all 
bilateral and regional agreements which are in the making, the speedy settlement of 
bilateral trade disputes, a strong engagement of the US President for receiving a 
negotiation mandate from the Congress and the unconditional implementation of all 
commitments which were taken in the Uruguay Round including agriculture, services and 
textiles. By early 2002, however, there is little evidence that the conventional way to trade 
liberalization is the politically preferred one. Neither are bilateral or regional negotiations 




trade seem to emerge. Finally, the implementation of Uruguay Round commitments is 
sluggish and characterized by trials to find loopholes in the legal documents.  
5.2 The Unconventional Way: Liberalization à la Carte 
When the authors addressed the issue of TAFTA for the first time (SIEBERT ET AL., 1996) 
they were fairly optimistic that a US-EU specific transatlantic liberalization initiative 
TALI could be based on the objective to act as a spear-head for the implementation for the 
Uruguay Round. Six years of experience with the implementation record, however, do not 
give rise to optimism. The two parties refused to accept this role and instead became 
victims of a quagmire of delays, disputes and mutual dissatisfaction. More modesty seems 
at stake. Such a minimum approach could comprise initiatives to so-called trade 
facilitation which includes, for instance, the streamlining of customs declaration 
procedures or the facilitation of preinspection procedures. Bilateral working groups could 
work out common proposals and open them to third parties within the multilateral trading 
order. The two parties could also set the pace for new issues which came up only after the 
Uruguay Round such as rules for trading in electronic media, a WTO-consistent 
application of the so-called precautionary principle as well as the identification of hitherto 
nontransparent trading costs. To concentrate aspects of trade facilitation on new issues 
instead of the old ones, carries an important advantage. The new issues are not yet blocked 






5.3  The Controversial Way: Moving Towards Open Regionalism 
For the time being, it seems unrealistic, to expect a breakthrough in the so-called open 
regionalism of APEC which basically is a regionally concerted approach to conditional 
MFN. Heterogeneity and diverging interests are seemingly too large to be reconcilable 
even within a wide framework and a long time horizon until the year 2020. Instead, the 
concept of open regionalism seems to be more promising in the transatlantic arena where 
the principle of conditional MFN treatment can be more easily extended to the trading 
partners of the US and EU especially if these partners are already linked to one of the two 
areas through bilateral agreements. The underlying idea is to commit the countries to the 
principle of MFN treatment and to induce them by facilitating the access to the two 
transatlantic markets. As an example, the free trade agreement of the Americas would be 
more acceptable and appealing to Latin American countries if any concessions negotiated 
between the North and the Latin American countries would be offered to the EU provided 
that the EU would follow suit by opening its market. In doing so, EU-US trade cooperation 
could still be called a regional initiative like TALI but would loose its negative momentum 
as a “lock-out mechanism” against third countries. 
6 Conclusions 
By the beginning of the new century, both the US and the EU seem to pay lip services to 
the multilateral system while intensifying their bilateral negotiations with third countries. 
This approach is highly vulnerable to raising transaction costs for countries which are 
excluded from these negotiations. The idea of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area is open to 
similar concerns. In this paper, we have shown that the disadvantages of TAFTA to  the 




transatlantic trade liberalization promise better results both for the partners as well as the 
rest of the world. Regrettably, however, neither the EU nor the US seem prepared to act 
jointly as pace setters for the liberalization of either old or new issues. In this respect, the 
old regionalism still seems to be unbeaten. TAFTA with its inherent lock-out 
characteristics would be a further step towards closed regionalism. Instead, there is more to 
be gained in terms of world welfare if the approach of conditional MFN treatment which 
seem to have failed in the Asia-Pacific Rim because of excessive heterogeneity would be 
taken more seriously in the North Atlantic Rim. This approval would place the US and the 
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